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ABSTRACT
Recent studies using functional magnetic resonance
imaging of patients in a vegetative state have raised the
possibility that such patients retain some degree of
consciousness. In this paper, the ethical implications of
such findings are outlined, in particular in relation to
decisions about withdrawing life-sustaining treatment. It
is sometimes assumed that if there is evidence of
consciousness, treatment should not be withdrawn. But,
paradoxically, the discovery of consciousness in very
severely brain-damaged patients may provide more
reason to let them die. Although functional neuroimaging
is likely to play an increasing role in the assessment of
patients in a vegetative state, caution is needed in the
interpretation of neuroimaging findings.
Following severe brain injury, some patients
emerge from coma to a vegetative state.
1 They
appear awake but unaware of themselves or of
their environment. The likelihood of recovery is
extremely small when the vegetative state persists
for more than 12 months following traumatic
brain injury, or 3 months with a non-traumatic
cause.
2 Beyond this point the vegetative state is
often referred to as ‘‘permanent’’. In such patients
life-sustaining treatment, including artificial nutri-
tion and hydration, is sometimes withdrawn. Legal
decisions relating to treatment withdrawal have
been highly controversial in cases such as those of
Karen Quinlan, Tony Bland or Terri Schiavo.
34
Nevertheless, when the diagnosis of a permanent
vegetative state is clear, many believe that it is
morally permissible to let such patients die.
5
Concern is sometimes expressed about allowing
patients in a vegetative state to die, because of the
possibility that they might actually be conscious
despite the absence of evidence of awareness. The
diagnosis of vegetative state is based upon the
observation of behavioural responses to stimuli,
and assessment of such patients can be extremely
difficult.
6 Recently published papers using func-
tional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) may
shed some light on this question. There is evidence
on fMRI of islands of preserved cognitive function,
7
including processing of spoken words
8 in some
patients in a vegetative state. There were specific
changes on fMRI seen in two patients in a
vegetative state asked to imagine themselves
performing an activity such as playing tennis or
walking through the rooms of a house, similar to
those observed in normal conscious individuals.
91 0
Those two patients, who had been in a vegetative
state for several months after traumatic brain
injuries, subsequently improved clinically to the
point at which they inconsistently responded to
stimuli
9 and met the criteria for a less severe
disorder of consciousness (a minimally conscious
state; MCS).
11 It is often assumed that the presence
of consciousness makes the withdrawal of life-
sustaining treatment problematical or even unjus-
tifiable.
12 The fMRI findings have thus been
claimed to have profound implications for treat-
ment decisions.
9
It was suggested at the time that both Terri
Schiavo,
13 and a more recent patient in the UK,
4
undergo fMRI before decisions about withdrawal
of artificial nutrition. Although in both cases the
courts rejected this suggestion, the question of the
role of neuroimaging in assessment and decision-
making for patients in an apparent vegetative state
is likely to be raised again.
14 Consciousness is a
difficult and contentious concept. Elsewhere we
have elaborated on the potential moral significance
of different forms of consciousness in severely
brain-damaged patients.
15 For this paper we have
assumed consciousness to involve at least minimal
sentience and the capacity to suffer. Here we wish
to address the ethical question raised by these
advances in neuroimaging: if we have evidence of
consciousness in a patient previously thought to be
in a vegetative state, is it permissible to withdraw
life-sustaining treatment? We review the ethical
basis for withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment,
and the possible relevance of neuroimaging find-
ings for such decisions. Importantly, evidence of
consciousness from neuroimaging may provide
reasons both for and against continuing to keep
such patients alive.
ARE THEY CONSCIOUS? POSSIBLE
INTERPRETATIONS OF NEUROIMAGING
Before considering how neuroimaging may affect
treatment withdrawal decisions, it is worthwhile
outlining different possible interpretations of the
neuroimaging findings. The researchers who
reported fMRI changes in response to instructions
were confident that their results established that
the patient was genuinely conscious of herself and
her surroundings.
10 This conclusion may be pre-
mature.
16 The responses to instructions might have
been automatic rather than evidence of conscious
volition.
17 18 For example, unconscious patients
under anaesthesia have evidence of cognitive
processing, including complex processing of lan-
guage.
19 It therefore remains unclear whether
reported fMRI responses do in fact represent
evidence of consciousness. Further research is
underway, and may resolve this empirical matter.
However it seems that there are three main
possibilities (box 1).
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neuroimaging are also open to interpretation. Failure to observe
changes in response to instructions or stimuli might be due to
the patient failing to hear, remember or understand instruc-
tions, or to being asleep.
20 Just as repeated behavioural testing is
required to make a diagnosis of a vegetative state, repeated
testing with functional neuroimaging may be necessary to
reduce the risk of false negative test results.
9 But how should
neuroimaging findings affect decisions about life-sustaining
treatment?
THE ETHICAL BASIS FOR WITHDRAWAL OF LIFE-SUSTAINING
TREATMENT IN A VEGETATIVE STATE
Decisions to continue or withdraw life-sustaining treatment
are influenced by a number of factors, reflecting the ethical
principles that are often drawn upon to guide medical care.
21–24
First, the patient’s wishes may be known, for example in the
form of an advance directive, and in accordance with the
principle of respect for autonomy this may guide decisions
either to continue or to discontinue treatment. Second,
o n g o i n gt r e a t m e n tm a yb ej u d g e dt ob ef u t i l eo nt h eb a s i so f
the very low likelihood of significant recovery, and may risk
harming the patient. Such concerns can be based upon the
principle of non-maleficence. Third, consideration may be
given to the best interests of the patient, and whether the
benefits outweigh the burdens of treatment (the principle of
beneficence). As patients in a vegetative state have generally
been thought to lack all awareness, some have argued that
they do not have interests as such, and hence providing life-
sustaining treatment cannot be in their interests.
52 52 6Finally,
considerations of distributive justice may warrant withdrawal
of treatment when such treatment (for example intensive
care) has finite availability and other individuals have greater
prospects of recovery.
21
Arguments in favour of continuing life-sustaining treatment
The detection of possible consciousness using fMRI or other
forms of imaging might have relevance to considerations of the
patient’s wishes and autonomy. This would depend upon the
wording of advance directives, or upon how patients had
expressed to family and friends their wishes for future
treatment.
14 Given that few patients are likely to have explicitly
considered the possibility of being in a vegetative state, MCS or
LIS, it may be hard to know what the patient would have
wanted.
14 One intriguing possibility would be to use fMRI to
communicate with patients who have no other means of
expression.
92 02 7It may give such patients the chance to voice
their own opinion about the continuation or withdrawal of life-
sustaining treatment. At present this possibility remains
speculative.
Second, fMRI changes may imply a better prognosis for
patients in a vegetative state and lead to reconsideration of the
futility of ongoing treatment. A recent review of published case
reports and small case series suggested that patients in a
vegetative state studied in the first months who showed
activation of higher level associative cortices on neuroimaging
were more likely subsequently to improve clinically.
28 It is even
possible that neuroimaging could detect the rare patient in a
‘‘permanent’’ vegetative state who is able to make a significant
recovery. Alternatively, by identifying patients with islands of
preserved cognitive function, neuroimaging may direct the




Finally, consciousness may be relevant to the interests of the
patient. If the patient is minimally conscious or fully conscious,
they have interests that may be furthered by providing life-
sustaining treatment. They may be aware of their surroundings,
of family and friends, and may be able to take pleasure in those
things. There is no ethical or legal consensus about the
withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment from children or adults
in MCS or LIS.
23 30 If patients can be shown to be conscious or
even self-conscious, this may confer moral status,
15 31 which
would make a difference to an appraisal of whether life-
sustaining treatment should continue.
Arguments in favour of discontinuing life-sustaining treatment
On the other hand, neuroimaging findings may not predict
meaningful recovery. The reported findings
81 02 8are prelimin-
ary, and the degree of recovery often relatively minor (from
vegetative state to MCS). This recovery has occurred soon after
traumatic brain injury (ie, within the time period when
recovery is not unusual). There are no reports of patients in a
vegetative state identified as ‘‘conscious’’ by functional neuroi-
maging making a recovery to functional independence, and no
patients meeting the criteria for a permanent vegetative state
have shown these changes on fMRI.
Second, minimal degrees of consciousness may not be a
benefit to the patient. People with MCS following brain injury
are severely impaired, with only some evidence of voluntary
movement (for example patients may track an object with their
eyes), but without the capacity for functional communication.
32
Patients in a MCS seem to have only fleeting, fragmented
awareness of their environment. Although there is a greater
chance of recovery than with a vegetative state, most patients
in MCS for more than 12 months remain severely disabled.
11
Minimally conscious patients remain bed-bound, doubly incon-
tinent, dependent and limited in their ability to interact.
1 It is
not possible to know what being in a MCS would be like;
27
however, in one important way it may be considerably worse
than being in a vegetative state.
23 30 A recent positron emission
tomography study of minimally conscious patients strongly
suggests that they experience pain and suffer,
33 although they
are largely unable to tell us.
12 If such patients suffer they can be
harmed by continuing treatment; there may be stronger reasons
Box 1 Possible interpretations of neuroimaging evidence
of ‘‘consciousness’’
c No consciousness: patients who demonstrate evidence of
language processing, or patterns of brain activation in
response to instruction, have no genuine awareness of these
stimuli; these are merely automatic responses.
c Minimal consciousness: although lacking sustained,
reproducible, voluntary or purposeful behavioural responses to
stimuli, some patients in a vegetative state respond to stimuli
with functional changes that are detectable with
neuroimaging. They may have intermittent, incomplete
consciousness of themselves and their surroundings. These
patients may represent an overlap category with MCS or they
may be emerging from a vegetative state to MCS.
c Full consciousness: patients who are able to obey instructions
and demonstrate patterns of activation on functional imaging
may be completely aware of their surroundings. Some patients
who appear to be in a vegetative state may actually be in a
complete form of the locked-in syndrome (LIS).
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to allow them to die. This must be balanced against the
possibility of having positive experiences, and the greater
uncertainty about prognosis for such patients compared with
those in a permanent vegetative state.
27
Third, consciousness does not preclude withdrawal of life-
sustaining treatment. It is ethical to withdraw life-sustaining
treatment even from patients who are fully conscious, for
example when the patient requests it, when the treatment is
futile, or when the burdens of treatment outweigh their
benefits.
24 N e u r o i m a g i n gm i g h ti n d i c a t et h a tap a t i e n tw h o
appears to be in a vegetative state is actually fully conscious
and ‘‘locked-in’’. Whereas it might be thought that we are
morally required to do our best to preserve the life of a patient
in this state, some might ask whether such a life is worse than
death. A number of patients with LIS express a desire not to
go on living
3 and some request euthanasia.
34 On the other hand
the capacity of humans to adapt to their condition, no matter
how adverse, has been amply documented in other contexts.
Indeed, the self-scored perception of mental wellbeing in one
survey of patients with LIS was not significantly lower than
that of age-matched normal subjects.
35 However, surveys of
patients able to communicate may not be relevant to a more
severely affected population of patients with full LIS and an
apparent vegetative state. Many may also have been in such a
state for a long time. Their situation might be compared
unfavourably with the worst form of solitary confinement in
prison. It is not necessarily clear, on the basis of the best
interests of such patients, that life-sustaining treatment
should be continued. This is a subject that requires further
active debate.
Finally, considerations of medical utility
21 and distributive
justice may warrant the prioritisation of scarce medical
resources to other patients with greater prospect of benefit
even if consciousness is detected with neuroimaging, especially
in cases in which the life sustained contains significant
suffering.
CONCLUSIONS
It is early days for fMRI in patients in a vegetative state and
reported findings need to be interpreted with caution.
36 There
are well-defined methodological limitations of fMRI.
37
Techniques for interrogation of consciousness such as those
discussed in this paper are available only in a small number of
centres in the context of research studies. It is not yet clear
whether fMRI changes represent automatic responses or
whether they represent minimal or even full consciousness.
There is very limited evidence for the prognostic relevance of
fMRI, or for its use in identifying patients amenable to therapy.
fMRI has already been called for in legal disputes about
treatment withdrawal from patients in a vegetative state, and is
likely to be called upon for this purpose increasingly.
14 Within
existing legal frameworks it may have some relevance for such
decisions.
38 Yet it will be important to avoid jumping to
conclusions about whether such patients are conscious or whether
treatment should be continued on the basis of neuroimaging.
Whether such patients are conscious, minimally or fully, may be
relevant to their interests, although this may provide reasons both
for and against continuing life-sustaining treatment.
Advances in neuroimaging may inform management, but do
not and will not in themselves settle ethical questions around
the treatment of people with severe neurological disorders. Such
decisions require both good science and good ethical judgement.
Paradoxically, the discovery of consciousness in very severely
brain-damaged patients may give us more reason to discontinue
life-sustaining treatment than to continue it.
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